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DELBERT M. DICKEMORE and ] 
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| APPELLEE'S REPLY BRIEF 
i Appeals Court Case No. 
) Supreme Court Case No. 960514 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to § 78-2-2(3)(J). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. The trial court did not commit an error when it upheld the stipulation entered into 
by the parties before the court, and divided the property equally between the parties. 
2. The trial court did not commit an error in refusing to vacate its final judgment, and 
it was not mistaken as to the value of the various parcels of real property involved in this lawsuit. 
3. The trial court did not err in its division of Parcel 5. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
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This is an appeal from a final order of the Second Judicial District Court, State of Utah, 
Weber County, Ogden Department, by which the court divided trust assets among trust 
beneficiaries. 
This action originated from plaintiffs claim to compel defendants to convey a certain 
portion of Parcel 5 which had been conveyed to defendant, back to the family trust in order to 
allow for a home located on Parcel 5 to have 100 feet of frontage (see plaintiffs complaint). 
Defendant responded by filing a counterclaim and cross claim asking the court to divide the 
property in question between the parties at issue, and that the court do so equitably, among 
other things (see defendant's counterclaim and cross claim). 
Trial was held July 27 and 28, 1995, following which the trial court entered a decision on 
August 3, 1995, ordering reconveyance of the Dickemore residence and the adjoining Parcel 5 in 
order to permit the sale of the residence, and to allow for a 100 foot frontage (R.081). Following 
this decision by the court, the court made findings of fact and conclusions of law, and ordered the 
re-transfer to the trustees of Parcel 5 fronting the Dickemore residence in order to permit the sale 
of said residence (R.101). Findings of fact and conclusions of law followed on December 13, 
1995(R.101). 
The court entered its final decision, including its own findings of fact and conclusions of 
law, one year following the trial which was on or about July 29, 1996, due to the fact that plaintiffs 
had submitted several versions of the court's findings of fact and conclusions of law, each of 
which grossly misrepresented the court's actual findings, thus requiring the court to eventually 
prepare accurate findings of fact and conclusions of law itself after several hearings were held. 
The court ordered the parties to reconvey Parcel 5 to the trust and distribute the Dickemore farm 
property and the proceeds from the sale of the residence among the three Dickemore brothers 
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(R.192). Plaintiff moved to vacate this decision of the court under Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. On October 23, 1996, the court entered an order denying plaintiffs motion to vacate 
the court's decision (R.243). When the court failed to grant plaintiff's motion to vacate the court's 
decision, plaintiff filed this appeal. Defendants then filed a cross appeal, but has since filed a 
voluntary withdrawal of their cross-appeal (see defendant's voluntary withdrawal). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellants Donna D. Penrod, Delbert M. Dickemore, Roland D. Dickemore, Joyce B. 
Bennett and Carol Lynn Davis, and the defendant Glenn N. Dickemore, are the six surviving 
children of Amelia Dickemore, who died January 9, 1991. 
All assets of Amelia's estate were subject to an inter-vivos trust executed by Amelia and 
her husband, Adam, on March 28, 1982 which trust was amended on or about July 19, 1990. 
Two of Amelia's children, Donna D. Penrod and Delbert M. Dickemore, were designated trustees 
with power to subdivide and sell trust property. Amelia's trust essentially provided that her 
daughters were to "receive an equal share of the remaining cash and evidences of 
indebtedness", and that her sons were to "receive an equal share of the real property". However, 
her residence was to be "divided equally among all my then surviving children" (R.065-066). All 
six children have survived Amelia Dickemore. 
After Amelia Dickemore passed away, differences arose between her six children and 
constant contention existed among the three sons who were to receive the real property, due to 
the fact that said real property was to be held by Amelia Dickemore's sons as tenants in 
common. This contention came to a head when the defendant's brothers approached the 
defendant and asked that he convey his portion of Parcel 5 back to the trust so that Amelia 
Dickemore's residence would have a 100 foot frontage, thereby allowing the residence to be sold 
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pursuant to Pleasant View City ordinances. When confronted with this request from his two 
brothers, Glen Dickemore responded by agreeing to convey his portion of Parcel 5 back to the 
trust if he were given frontage for his own personal residence, which was adjacent to Amelia's 
Dickmore's residence and also had no frontage. When defendant asked his brothers that he also 
be given a 100 foot frontage thereby allowing his home to be sold in accordance with Pleasant 
View City ordinances, defendant's brothers flatly denied his request. As such, defendant refused 
to convey his portion of Parcel 5 back to the trust. Based on defendant's failure to agree to 
convey his interest in Parcel 5 back to the trust, plaintiffs filed this action in an attempt to compel 
defendant to convey his interest in Parcel 5 back to the trust. Defendant responded to plaintiffs' 
complaint by filing a counter claim and cross claim wherein defendant requested the court make 
an equitable distribution of all the real property which was a part of Amelia Dickemore's trust. 
Those were the issues the trial court was faced with in resolving the dispute between the parties 
to this action. 
In December of 1993, an appraisal was done on the five parcels of real estate which are 
at issue in this case. On the first day of trial in this case, all parties stipulated that the values of 
the five parcels of real estate at issue in this action should be represented by the values reflected 
in the appraisal which had been conducted in 1993. All parties knew and understood that the 
values of each of the five parcels of land represented in the 1993 appraisal were well below the 
current fair market value, but as a means to simplify the distribution of these five parcels of 
property, all parties agreed to accept the 1993 appraisal values in that they represented the 
values of each of the five parcels as the parcels related to each other. Based on the parties' 
stipulation, the court used the 1993 appraisal values of the five parcels of property in distributing 
the property to the three brothers. All parties to this action knew that the 1993 values which were 
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stipulated to, and which the court used to make its distribution of the five parcels of property, 
were well below the current market value, but nonetheless each party agreed to have those 
values used by the court in making its distribution. Furthermore, at the commencement of trial all 
parties to this action stipulated in open court that Glen Dickemore, the defendant in the 
underlying action, should be given Parcel 1 which constituted approximately forty acres, and that 
these forty acres, per acre, were the least desirable and the least valuable of all the property. 
During the course of trial, an offer to purchase all five parcels of land for the sum total of 
$259,500 was made. This offer included $79,500 for the residence and the remainder for the 
remaining real estate that was a part of Amelia Dickemore's trust. Plaintiffs did not accept this 
offer and stated they did not want to sell the property at all. 
In attempting to make a fair and equitable distribution of the real property of Amelia 
Dickemore's trust, the court initially ordered that Parcel 1 go to Glen and Parcels 2, 3 and 4 be 
divided between Delbert and Roland, and that Parcel 5 be sold with the residence. In so doing, 
the court distributed water shares in proportion to the acreage of real estate that had been 
distributed to each of the three brothers. 
In regards to the brothers' interest in the sale of Amelia's residence and the proceeds 
realized from said sale, the court, in its order dated July 29, 1996, ordered that the brothers 
share $38,950 as their one-half interest in the sale of the family residence. In Judge West's 
order dated July 29, 1996, and included with appellants' brief as Addendum 13, Judge West 
indicates that the three brothers' share of the sale of the family residence amounts to $38,950 
each. 
In July of 1996, one year after the court rendered its decision, the court signed its final order. 
The plaintiffs were unsatisfied with the Judge's order and, as such, filed a motion to vacate the 
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Judge's order on or about August 16, 1996 (R.219 - 227), and the defendant filed a motion for 
sanctions against the plaintiffs. Oral arguments were heard on these motions after which Judge 
West denied the plaintiffs' motion to vacate his order and in doing so affirmatively stated that no 
mistake had been made as to the value of the five parcels of property; that all parties knew at the 
time they stipulated to the 1993 appraised values that these values were not reflective of the actual 
values at the time of trial. Furthermore, in his order on plaintiffs' motion to vacate, Judge West 
specifically stated that from the beginning, the plaintiffs had stipulated to and accepted the 1993 
appraised values of Parcels 1,2, , 4 and 5 and also had stipulated to giving Parcel 1 to Glen 
Dickemore. As such, Judge West upheld his order and denied the plaintiff's motion to vacate and 
also denied defendant's motion for sanctions. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The parties to this action stipulated in open court at the beginning of trial to use a 1993 
appraisal of the five parcels of property at issue in this case as a means of establishing the relative 
values of each of the five parcels of land. In so stipulating, each party knew that the values they 
stipulated to did not reflect the actual fair market value, and as such, the court's decision in this case 
was correct. Case law clearly indicates that stipulations made in open court are valid and should 
be upheld by the court unless good cause is shown to the contrary. As the court indicated in its final 
order, no mistakes were made and all parties to this action knew at the time trial began that the 
values of each of the five parcels of property used in trial were for comparison purposes only, and 
were not meant to reflect, in any way, actual values and with this knowledge, the parties willingly 
stipulated as to the relative values of the five parcels of property. 
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The appellants contention that title to parcel 5 may now be somehow clouded, which appellee 
firmly contends is not the case, is not an issue which should even be before this court on appeal. 
As such, this court should uphold the trial court's decision in this case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DISTRIBUTING THE FIVE PARCELS OF 
REAL PROPERTY AT ISSUE IN THIS CASE PURSUANT TO THE 
STIPULATION THAT THE PARTIES ENTERED INTO AT THE BEGINNING 
OF THE TRIAL. 
At the beginning of trial in the case at hand, the parties stipulated in open court that the real 
property at issue in this case should be distributed to the parties, and in so doing Glen Dickemore 
should get Parcel 1, together with enough of the other properties to equal his shares, and that his 
two brothers, Roland and Delbert, should get a share of the four remaining parcels. Furthermore, 
the parties stipulated that each of the five parcels of real property at issue in this case would be 
divided by the judge pursuant to the values they were given in a 1993 appraisal done on the five 
parcels of property. The parties stipulated and agreed that the 1993 appraised values of the five 
parcels of land be accepted and be used by the court in distributing the land to the three brothers. 
The court acknowledged and accepted this stipulation, and in the end made an equitable distribution 
of the five parcels of real property in accordance with the stipulation the parties had entered into and 
agreed to. 
The court was correct to rely on the stipulation of the parties in distributing the five parcels 
of property at issue in this case. In referring to Gottwals v. Rencher. 98 P.2d 481 (Nev. 1940), one 
legal authority has stated that: 
. . . Courts ordinarily look with favor on stipulations designed to simplify, 
shorten, or settle litigation and save costs to the parties, and such 
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stipulations should be encouraged by the courts rather than discouraged, and 
enforced by them unless good cause is shown to the contrary. . . 
83 C.J.S. 3, §2. 
In the case at hand, good cause has not been shown as to why the stipulation should not be 
enforced by the court and as such the court did not err in enforcing the stipulation it had 
acknowledged and accepted. In acknowledging and accepting the stipulation between the parties 
to this action, the court is bound by the terms of that stipulation and unless good clear cause exists 
to the contrary, the court should honor and adhere to that stipulation. In Meagher v. Gaaliardo. 35 
Cal. 602 (1868), a California court held that: 
. . . A stipulation made in open court constituted not only agreements 
between the parties, but between them and the court, which the latter is 
bound to enforce, not only for the benefit of the party interested * * * but for 
the protection of its own honor and dignity. 
Id. at 608. 
Other courts have gone even further. A Kentucky court has held that stipulations, such as 
the one at issue in this case, are binding on the trial court. In Barker v. Reese. 372 S.W. 2d, 788 
(Ky. 1963), the court held that the trial court was bound by a stipulation entered into by the parties 
concerning the correct location of a common line between their properties which was the matter in 
controversy, and this Kentucky court held that it was an error for the trial court to fix another 
boundary line which had been excluded from the consideration of the court by the judicial admission 
of the parties by way of the parties' stipulation. Id. It has also been held that stipulations entered 
into by parties to an action are not only binding on the trial court, but also upon the appellate courts. 
In Rickenbera v. Capital Garaae. 68 Utah 30; 249 P. 121 (1926), the Utah court held that the 
stipulation entered into by the parties was binding on the appellate court. Id. In so doing, the court 
held that there was a stipulation by a claimant in an action to recover an automobile stored by the 
police when he was arrested for driving while intoxicated, and that the claimant was convicted of 
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such offense, is binding on the court of appeals. Id. Stipulations are clearly conclusive upon parties 
and the courts if they are within the permissible subject matter of the case. Stalford v. Barkalow. 31 
N.J. Super. 193; 106 Atlantic 2d 342 (1954). 
It is clear from the record in this case that all parties intended to enter into a stipulation, and 
did in fact enter into a stipulation, thereby agreeing in part that the real property associated with the 
inter-vivos trust of Amelia Dickemore should be equitably distributed between Amelia Dickemore's 
sons, namely Delbert, Roland and Glen. The parties also stipulated in the very beginning that Glen 
should receive Parcel 1. The court acknowledged and honored the stipulation in distributing the 
property among the three sons and specifically upheld the stipulation in its denial of plaintiffs' motion 
to vacate the final order. 
While there are situations where the court is not bound to enforce the terms of a validly 
executed stipulation, this case does not involve such a basis for disregard. In this case, not only 
was there no good cause shown as to why the stipulation should not be upheld, but no cause 
has been shown for why the court should not enforce the valid stipulation the parties entered 
into. In Woods v. First Nat. Bank of Chicago. 41 N.E. 2d 235 (III. 1942), the court held that 
"stipulations are under the control and subject to the discretion of the court". In Palmer v. City of 
Long Beach. 199 P. 2d 952 (Ca. 1948), the court held that a court has power to relieve the 
parties from the terms of a stipulation, but that this power is based on an application and 
showing of sufficient cause, and in In re: Miakka's Estate. 134 P.2d 723 (Col. 1942), a Colorado 
court held that the question of whether or not a stipulation shall be set aside rests in the 
discretion of the court, and requires an "extraordinary" exercise of its powers, which can be 
allowable and proper only when it is made clear that it is necessary to prevent injustice. Id. at 
725. 
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In the case at hand, the parties stipulated to the fact that the appraisal of each relevant 
parcel of land was below each parcel's fair market value, and that the court should use the 1993 
appraised value for a basis to compare each individual parcel of land's value as each parcel 
related to the other parcels. After acknowledging the stipulation between the parties and 
accepting the stipulation, the court proceed to distribute the parcels of real property to each of 
the three sons in a manner that was pursuant to the parties stipulation. The plaintiffs in this case 
have given no reason and shown no cause whatsoever as to why the stipulation should be set 
aside. The plaintiffs argument that they now have discovered that parcel 1, which was 
distributed to the defendant, has a value greater than the 1993 appraised value, should come as 
no surprise. In stipulating to the 1993 appraised values, the plaintiffs acknowledged that said 
values were below the fair market value, and Judge West specifically ruled in his order denying 
plaintiffs motion to vacate that the parties knew the values used were not the actual values and 
that, as such, no mistake existed. While it may or may not be true that Parcel 1 now has the 
value the plaintiffs claim is has, it is only logical to assume that Parcels 2, 3, 4 and 5 have 
increased values equal to or above that of Parcel 1. As such, the plaintiffs claim that they did not 
know that parcel 1 has the value it has is without merit, and the trial court's equitable distribution 
of the five parcels of real estate involved in this case should stand. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT'S FINAL DECISION OF DISTRIBUTION FOR PARCEL 5 
SHOULD STAND. 
A. Plaintiffs' contention that title to Parcel 5 is clouded is not subject 
to appeal. 
Plaintiffs' claim that the distribution of Parcel 5 has clouded the title of Parcel 5, which 
parcel is now owned by a third party, is without merit. The issue of clouding Parcel 5's title was 
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never at issue before the trial court, nor did the trial court ever take any testimony nor receive any 
evidence whatsoever regarding the status of Parcel 5's title, and as such never rendered a 
decision as to the status of Parcel 5's title. Furthermore, Parcel 5 was purchased during 
litigation. The purchasers of Parcel 5 assumed a certain risk as to the ultimate state of Parcel 5 
and as such the plaintiffs should not be allowed to now claim that the purchaser of Parcel 5 may 
suffer some type of damage. Because the question of whether Parcel 5 has clear title or not has 
never been before the trial court, it is not an issue which this court can review, and furthermore, 
because it is not the appellants themselves whose title may now be clouded, they have no 
standing to raise the issue of possible title problems with Parcel 5. 
B. The trial court specifically ordered a portion of Parcel 5 go to the three 
Dickemore brothers as tenants in common. 
The court ordered Parcel 5 unified and sold. The purpose of this unification was 
to give the home located on the back portion of Parcel 5 a 100 foot frontage. After that frontage 
was created, there existed excess land. This excess land was in controversy because all three 
brothers wanted it. In fact, Delbert entered into a secret agreement with the purchasers of the 
home on Parcel 5 so that he would receive the excess land (June 6, 1996, hearing pages 35-38). 
The Court never intended that all of Parcel 5 go to the purchasers, and Delbert knew this, as did 
the purchasers. Otherwise they would not have entered into this secret agreement. Upon the 
trial Court being notified of this secret agreement, the Court ordered the excess portion of Parcel 
5 placed in the name of all three brothers as tenants in common, and included certain easements 
for the benefit of all brothers, and as such, the brothers' portion of Parcel 5 is undevelopable. 
The purchasers received a deed from Delbert Dickemore and, knowing the court's order in this 
matter, held that deed and recorded it with the Weber County Recorder's Office after final 
judgment was entered (see attached Exhibit "A"). Glen Dickemore has now started a quiet title 
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and trespass action in Weber County District Court to remove the alleged purchasers from this 
property. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the parties to this action stipulated in open court at the beginning of trial as to 
the relative values of each of the five parcels of land that are at issue in this appeal, knowing that 
the values they stipulated to did not reflect the true fair market value, the court's decision was 
correct. As the court indicated in its final order, no mistakes were made and all parties to this 
action knew at the time trial began that the values of each of the five parcels of property used in 
trial were for comparison purposes only, and were not meant to reflect, in any way, actual values. 
The question of whether title to parcel 5 may now be somehow clouded, which appellee 
firmly contends is not the case, is not an issue which should be subject to this appeal. As such, 
this court should uphold the trial court's decision in this case. 
The appellee has unnecessarily incurred attorney fees in this action and should be 
awarded their attorney fees and costs pursuant to Rule 34 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure for having to respond to this appeal. 
/A DATED this _/i^3ay of April, 1997. 
MERLIN G. CALVER, 
Attorney for Glen and Myrla Dickemore 
APPELLEE'S REPLY BRIEF 
Dickemore v. Dickemore 
Page 13 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the //P^day of April, 1997, I mailed, postage prepaid, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Appellee's Reply Brief to: 
William Critchlow 
Parker, Thornley & Critchlow 
2610 Washington Boulevard 
OgdenUT 84401 
Secretary 
GRANTEE'S ADDRESS 
SECOND DISTRICT COURT 
'85 ma H ?n H 07 
WARRANTY DEED ^^?<^7^SS 
DELBERT DICKEMORE AND DONNA PENROD, Trustees of the DICKEMORE FAMILY 
REVOCABLE TRUST grantor 
:Sden 
County of WEBER State of Utah, hereby 
County. 
VEY and WARRANT to 
MONTY A. YOUNG and VICKY L. YOUNG, 
husband and wi fe , as j o i n t tenants 
leasant View County WEBER , State of Utah 
: sum of ten dol lars and other good and valuable cons iderat ions DOLLARS 
• lowing described tract of land in 
f^ Utah, to-wit: 
:2 l e g a l descr ipt ion attached hereto and made a part thereof . 
E* 1 * 2 9 9 7 7 B K 1 8 2 6 P G 5 0 1 
DOUG CROFTSr WEBER COUNTY RECORDER 
18-SEP-96 212 PH FEE $14.00 DEP HH 
REC FOR: VICKY.L..Y0UN6 
"NESS die hand of said grantor s, this - 3 r d day of February A. D. 19 96 
ri in the presence of ^ ^
 D I C K E M 0 R E § T R U S T E £ 
^^rxHa&c / ^ S ^ ^ ^ . 
DONNA PENROD, TRUSTEE 
•E OF U T A H ^ 
S T Y OF ••'.-E5ZR >• 
of Pleasant View County WEBER 
for the sum of ten dollars and other good and valuable considerations 
rhc following described tract ofUndin 
State of Utah, to~wir: 
State of Utah 
DOLLARS 
County, 
see l e g a l descript ion attached hereto and made a part thereof. 
DOUG CROFTS, WEBER COUNH RECORDER 
ig-SEP-96 212 Pft FEE *U-00 OEF ItH 
REC FORI VICKY.L..Y0UN6 
WITNESS the hand of said grax>tors, this 23rd day of February 
Signed in the presence of 
A. D. 19 96 
DELBERT DICKEMORE, TRUSTEE 
DONNA PENROD, TRUSTEE 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF VE3ER 
SS. 
Onthe23rd day of February A. D. 19 96 personally 
appeared before me DELBERT DICKEMORE TRUSTEE AND DONNA PENROD, 
TRUSTEE, OF THE DICKEMORE FAMILY REVOCABLE TRUST 
the signer sof die wirhin insrrumenr who duly acknowledged 
to me rhat the y executed the same. 
am m Notary Public Residing at _ •^Qyrr- r.fjfsfjL :o/ 
A S S O C I A T E D TITLE C O M P A N Y My Commission Expires:. 
rdcr No. 
SALT LAKE 353-0909 BOUNTIFUL 298*2400 OREM 224-4133 PARK CITY 532-8428 
Descr iDtion 
PART OF THE SOUTHWEST QUARTER OF SECTION 24, TOWNSHIP 7 NORTH, 
RANGE 2 WEST. SALT LAKE BASE AND MERIDIAN. U.S. SURVEY: 
BEGINNING- AT THE SOUTHEAST CORNER OF THE ROLAND DEAN DICKEMORE 
PROPERTY WHICH IS SOUTH 0OD2£'20" WEST 884.53 FEET ALONG 
WEST LINE OF SAID SECTION 24. AND SOUTH 89D33'4<V EAST 
1597.51 FEET FROM THE NORTHWEST CORNER OF SAID SOUTHWEST 
QUARTER, RUNNING THENCE SOUTH 29D00'25" EAST 192 18 FEET* 
THENCE SOUTH 47D54' WEST 222.71 FEET; THENCE NORTH 2SD35' WEST 
235.95 FEET, THENCE NORTH 59D41' EAST 217.80 FEET TO THE 
POINT OF BEGINNING. 
SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOWING RIGHT OF WAY: BEGINNING AT THE 
SOUTHEAST CORNER OF THE ABOVE DESCRIBED PARCEL OF LAND AND 
RUNNING THENCE SOUTH 72D04'27" WEST SI.17 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 
5SD24'56" WEST 158.13 FEET TO THE EASTERLY RIGHT OF WAY LINE 
OF STATE HIGHWAY 20S, 89 & 91; THENCE NORTH 29D35'(X>" WEST 
ALONG SAID RIGHT OF WAY 16.50 FEET; THENCE NORTH 58D24'5S" 
EAST 158.13 FEET; THENCE NORTH 72D04'27" EAST 61.17 FEET-
THENCE SOUTH 29D35'00" EAST 16.50 FEET TO THE POINT OF ' 
BEGINNING. 
LESS AND EXCEPTING THE FOLLOWING: 
Part of the Southwest Quarter of Section 24, Township 7 North, Range 2 West, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian. Beginning at the Southeast corner of the Roland Dean D.ckernore 
property located South 00°26'20" West along the West line of sa.d Section 24, 884.53 
feet and South 89°33'40" East 1597.51 feet from the Northwest corner of said Southwest 
Qurte and running thence North 5 9 - 4 1 W East 104 05 feet; thence South 4 £ 2 ? W 
East 91 57 feef thence South 54°15'11" West 36.87 feet; thence South 35°44 49 East 
f43fe5el; thence NcCrth B4-15'11" East 40.33 feet; ^™*^*™™l$£l?™ 
feet to the Northeast corner of the Glen Dickemore property; thence South 47°54 00 west 
SOTO said Property line 155.45 feet; thence North 2 9 ° 3 5 W West 89.97 feet; thence 
couth «9 •47'36" West 217.80 feet to the Northeasterly Highway right of way I'nej th««J 
North 29°35'00" West along said right of way line 100.00 feet; thence North 59°41 00 
East 2', 7.80 feet to the point of beginning. 
E* 1 4 - 2 9 9 7 7 BK1S26 PG502 
LEGEND: 
Parcel 5 
Land in question 
Glen Dickemore 
Delbert Dickemore 
Roland Dickemore 
